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This Study reviews the market trends for the development of digital networks and 
applications for 2020 and beyond and, on that basis, proposes a framework for 
an optimal regulation for telecommunications services in the European Union. 
Against that framework, the Study then critically assesses the draft European 
Electronic Communications Code proposed by the Commission in September 
2016. The authors submit that the Commission’s proposal goes in the right 
direction but in not ambitious enough to protect the EU consumers in the App 
economy and to stimulate the digital single market. Universal service should 
ensure an extensive availability of Wi-Fi connections throughout the EU and that 
citizens need to be protected by general consumer protection rules that are 
smarter and better enforced instead of detailed and complicated sector-specific 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
KEY FINDINGS 
Telecom trends towards 2030 
- The use of digital applications will continue to grow rapidly in the future. On 
residential markets, the fastest growth may come from time-delayed TV 
services, mobile location services and m-commerce. 
- This growth of application and the use of video will be translated in growth in 
IP traffic at a compound annual growth rate in the range of 20-25%.  
- In turn, this growth in IP traffic will continue to increase the connectivity 
needs. 
Optimal regulatory model 
- Given the positive feedback loops between the deployment of new or 
upgraded digital networks and the diffusion of digital applications, an optimal 
regulation should be holistic and support digital demand as well as digital 
supply. 
- Regarding digital networks, the policy priority is to ensure deployment of new 
and upgraded networks capable of meeting the connectivity needs required 
by the new digital applications. Regarding digital services, the priority is to 
stimulate the development and then the scale up of Internet applications with 
the removal of cross-borders barriers.  
- The optimal governance framework is different for the regulation of digital 
networks and digital services because of their different characteristics: 
networks are localised and cannot be traded across borders while services can 
be traded between the Member States. The regulation of digital networks 
should be based on a strengthened open method of coordination with 
possibility of Commission binding intervention when needed. The regulation 
of digital services should be based on a strict application of the home country 
control and a full harmonisation of the main rules protecting public interest 
with effective and harmonised enforcement of those rules by strong and 
independent national agencies. 
Regulation of networks and spectrum 
- Given the trends in the use of digital applications and the duration of 
investment cycle in network deployment, ambitious connectivity targets are 
justified provided they remain technologically neutral. 
- Those ambitious goals could only be met with ambitious reforms of access 
regulation as well as national and EU financing of new or upgraded networks. 
- Spectrum assignment, while remaining a national competence, should be 
better coordinated at the EU level and made more coherent with other 
regulatory interventions. 
Internet access services and universal service 
- In the Internet age, universal service should focus on affordable broadband 
connections allowing access to the indispensable e-services (such as email, 
telephony and video, social network, online news, ecommerce site and e-gov 
Optimal regulatory model for telecommunications services in the EU 
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services). In an app economy, universal service should maximise the 
availability and the affordability of Wi-Fi connections. 
- Users of Internet access service need to be protected given the importance of 
a service which is the door to the Information society and the often little 
competition for its provision. This can be achieved with general consumer 
protection rules which are smarter and better enforced complemented with 
the net neutrality EU rules adopted in 2015 with the Open Internet Regulation. 
Interpersonal communications services 
- Traditional telecommunications services are not (any more) so special and do 
not require any more extensive sector-specific consumer protection rules. The 
use of communications OTTs is rapidly growing in the EU indicating consumers’ 
satisfaction. They should not be subject to legacy rules that were justified at 
the time of traditional telephony but not today. Moreover, the use of telephone 
numbers justify additional obligations. 
- Telecommunications services are global by nature and are instrumental in 
building the digital single market. Hence, regulatory fragmentation and the 
application of 28 regulatory frameworks should be avoided. 
- In the context of the current review of the EU consumer acquis, rules should 
be made smarter by better taking into account the numerous consumers’ 
biases and by better integrating consumer protection directly into the 
computer code (‘consumer protection by design’). 
- Moreover, those general rules should be better enforced at the national level 
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 TELECOMS TRENDS TOWARDS 2030 
KEY FINDINGS 
- The use of digital applications will continue to grow rapidly in the future. On 
residential markets, the fastest growth may come from time-delayed TV 
services, mobile location services and m-commerce. 
- This growth of application and the use of video will be translated in growth in 
IP traffic at a compound annual growth rate in the range of 20-25%.  
- In turn, this growth in IP traffic will continue to increase the connectivity 
needs. 
 
Although it is difficult to make predictions for the digital economy which is facing many 
disruptive changes, some trends can be clearly identified: more connections, fuelled by the 
Internet of Things and the connected devices and more applications leading to more traffic, 
in particular video requiring more connectivity.   
1.1. Trends regarding Internet connections and applications 
1.1.1. Residential markets 
On the residential markets, Cisco1 predicts that digital TV and social networking will be the 
two services with the highest penetration rates by 2020 and that the fastest growth will come 
from time-delayed TV services such as personal video recorder (PVR) and digital video 
recorder (DVR) services. 
Figure 1: Global Residential Services Adoption and Growth 
 
Source: Cisco (2016, p.13) 
Focusing in particular on mobile services, Cisco predicts that the fastest growth will be in 






                                           
1 CISCO Visual Networking Index (2016), The Zettabyte Era: Trends and Analysis, White Paper, p. 12. 
Optimal regulatory model for telecommunications services in the EU 
 
PE 595.368 9  
 
Figure 2: Global Consumer Mobile Services Adoption and Growth 
 
Source: Cisco (2016, p. 14) 
 
1.1.2. Business markets 
On the business markets, Cisco2 predicts the fastest growth for desktop and personal video 
conferencing, mainly because of its higher quality and lower prices. 
Figure 3: Global Business Services Adoption and Growth 
 
Source: Cisco (2016, p. 15) 
 
1.1.3. M2M Applications 
According to Cisco, connected home application such as home automation, home security 
and video surveillance, connected white goods, and tracking applications, will represent 
nearly half of the total M2M connections by 2020. Connected healthcare, with applications 
such as health monitors, medicine dispensers, first-responder connectivity, and telemedicine, 




                                           
2  CISCO Visual Networking Index (2016), The Zettabyte Era: Trends and Analysis, White Paper, p. 15. 
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Figure 4: Global M2M Connection Growth by Industries 
 
Source: Cisco (2016, p. 11) 
The rise of M2M applications will lead to massive deployment of ultra-narrowband Low-Power 
Wide-Area (LPWA) connectivity as M2M applications require low bandwidth and wide 
geographic coverage. 
 
1.1.4. Virtual and Augmented Reality 
According to Cisco,3 Virtual Reality (VR) headsets will grow from an installed base of 18 
million in 2016 to nearly a 100 million by 2021, a growth of 40 percent CAGR. Augmented 
Reality (AR) and VR market development are expected to follow a similar trend. While gaming 
is one of the key applications driving VR, AR is primarily been driven by industrial applications 
such as retail, medicine, education, tourism, retail shopping (furniture, clothes comparison, 
etc.). 
All these innovations in AR and VR will place new demands on the network in terms of its 
quality and performance. Bandwidth and latency requirements will become increasingly 
imperative for a high quality VR and AR experience. Globally, Virtual Reality traffic will grow 
11 fold from 13.3 Petabytes per month in 2016, to 140 Petabytes per month in 2021 (Cisco, 
2017, p.23). 
 
1.2. Trends regarding the IP traffic 
The important growth of Internet applications in the consumer and the business markets will 
continue to fuel the growth of IP traffic. According to Cisco (2016), the global IP traffic is 
expected to grow at the 22% GAGR until 2020 to end up with a 194 EB per month. Annual 
growth of global IP traffic growth is stabilising in the 20-25% range. A break-up of this trend 
by type of traffic, segment of customer and geographical area is available in Annex 1 of this 
report. The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of IP traffic for 2015-2020 is predicted to 





                                           
3  CISCO Visual Networking Index (2017), Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast: Update  2016-2021, White 
Paper. 
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Figure 5: Cisco VNI Forecasts for global IP Traffic 
 
Source: Cisco (2016, p. 4) 
When IP traffic is broken down by application, video is by far the application which is the 
most important one today and such pre-eminence will increase in the future. Cisco notes that 
most forms of Internet video do not have a large upstream component. Therefore, traffic is 
not becoming more symmetric contrary to the expectations raised when user-generated 
content first became popular. 
Figure 6: Global IP Traffic by Application Category 
 
 
Source: Cisco (2016, p. 15) 
When the IP traffic is broken down by devices, the main trend is the substitution of the PCs 
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Figure 7: Global IP Traffic by Devices 
 
Source: Cisco (2016, p. 6) 
 
1.3. Trends regarding connectivity requirement 
As noted by the European Commission, new Internet applications will require higher speed, 
sometimes bi-directional, and low latency. For instance, new applications such as 
autonomous driving, or VR and AR application requires very low latency. 
Figure 8: Applications’ bandwidth and latency requirement 
 
Source: European Commission based on GSMA and EIB 
 
 
Optimal regulatory model for telecommunications services in the EU 
 
PE 595.368 13  
By extrapolating from past trends and the expected scope for further growth in key digital 
service areas, WIK-Deloitte and IDATE4 have projected that fixed downstream traffic in the 
EU28 could increase by a factor of more than 7.5 between 2014 and 2025. The projected 
increases are driven to a large extent by video, which could see its share in total downstream 
traffic increase from 53% in 2014 to 68% in 2025, reflecting similar developments which 
have already occurred in the US. 
 
Figure 9: Fixed upstream traffic (EU28, petabytes/month) 
 
Source: WIK-Deloitte-IDATE (2016, p. 70) 
On that basis, WIK-Deloitte and IDATE5 anticipate that downstream traffic in the EU28 per 
connection will increase from 50GB/month to 298GB/month over the 2014-2025 period, 
which is much lower than the status quo predictions for the US, Canada or Japan as shown 
in Table 1. 
Table 1:  Evolution of fixed downstream traffic per geography 
(GB/fixed broadband line/month) 
 
 
Source: WIK-Deloitte-IDATE (2016, p. 71) 
Those evolution assume a continuation of the current trends as regards NGA deployment and 
take-up as well as bandwidth usage. However, demand for connectivity is not independent 
from the connectivity supply and the capacity of the network.  
                                           
4  WIK-Consult, Deloitte and IDATE (2016), Regulatory, in particular access, regimes for network investment models 
in Europe, Study for the European Commission, p. 69. 
5  WIK-Consult, Deloitte and IDATE (2016), Regulatory, in particular access, regimes for network investment models 
in Europe, Study for the European Commission, p. 70. 
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Therefore, WIK-Deloitte-IDATE forecast demand for connectivity according to three different 
scenarios of network supply. They found the following results: 
- Even in a status quo scenario the average bandwidth per connection will increase 
significantly. Downstream speeds will increase from 28 to 183Mbps while upstream 
speeds will increase more than eleven fold from 8 to 83 Mbps by 2025;  
- In a ‘mixed NGA’ scenario, average bandwidth would rise from 51 to 200 Mbps 
downstream and from 13 to 87 Mbps upstream; 
- In the all-FTTH/B setting connection speeds would rise to 345Mbps downstream in 
2025, up from 77 Mbps in 2015. In terms of upstream bandwidth, the average is 
expected to reach 236Mbps in 2025, compared to 54 Mbps in 2015 for this scenario. 
 
Figure 10: Average connection speed per scenario (Mbit/s EU28) 
 
Source: WIK-Deloitte-IDATE (2016, p. 75) 
Kenny and Williamson6 have summarised the recent studies forecasting domestic bandwidth 











                                           
6 Kenny R. and Williamson B. (2016), Connectivity for the Gigabit Society, Liberty Global Policy Series. 
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Figure 11:  Forecast domestic bandwidth needs (demanding users) and access 
link capabilities 
 
Source: Kenny and Williamson (2016, p. 25) 
The most ambitious studies, done by WIK-Deloitte and IDATE (2016) and by BT (2015), 
forecasts, under some circumstances, a need of 1 Gbits in 2025. Other less ambitious studies, 
such as the report done for the Broadband Stakeholders Group by Kenny and Broughton 
(2013), forecast only a need of 100 Mbits in 2025. 
Interestingly, Kenny and Williamson show that an upgrade of the current technologies, 
mainly G.fast for copper and DOCSIS 3.1 for cable, could meet the most ambitious forecast 
needs. However, WIK-Deloitte-IDATE consider that the upgrade of the current technologies 
may not be sufficient to meet the more ambitious forecasts, hence the deployment of FTTH 
may be required. 
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 OPTIMAL REGULATORY MODEL7 
KEY FINDINGS 
- Given the positive feedback loops between the deployment of new or 
upgraded digital networks and the diffusion of digital applications, an optimal 
regulation should be holistic and support digital demand as well as digital 
supply. 
- Regarding digital networks, the policy priority is to ensure deployment of new 
and upgraded networks capable of meeting the connectivity needs required 
by the new digital applications. Regarding digital services, the priority is to 
stimulate the development and then the scale up of Internet applications with 
the removal of cross-borders barriers.  
- The optimal governance framework is different for the regulation of digital 
networks and digital services because of their different characteristics: 
networks are localised and cannot be traded across borders while services can 
be traded between the Member States. The regulation of digital networks 
should be based on a strengthened open method of coordination with 
possibility of Commission binding intervention when needed. The regulation 
of digital services should be based on a strict application of the home country 
control and a full harmonisation of the main rules protecting public interest 
with effective and harmonised enforcement of those rules by strong and 
independent national agencies. 
 
To reap the full benefit of the digital economy, the EU needs to adopt rules which stimulate 
the deployment of networks able to support and meet the requirement of the new digital 
applications as well as the diffusion of those applications across the internal market. 
According to the Commission Better Regulation Guidelines,8 those rules need to be: 
- effective and meet those objectives, 
- efficient in meeting those objectives, 
- coherent between each other and with other EU rules, 
- and relevant. 
 
2.1. Need of a holistic approach 
As the deployment of the digital networks and the diffusion of the digital applications are 
linked with and feed each other, the EU decision makers should adopt a holistic 
approach dealing in a coherent manner with the regulation of the digital networks 
and services. 
This is the approach followed by the Commission in its Digital Single Market Strategy adopted 
in May 20159 with its three pillars: (1) ensure better access to digital goods and services, (2) 
guarantee right conditions for digital networks and services to flourish, (3) and maximise 
growth potential of the digital economy. 
                                           
7   This section is partly based on A. de Streel and P. Larouche (2016), An Integrated Regulatory Framework 
for Digital Networks and Services, CERRE Policy Report. 
8   Commission Better Regulation Guidelines of 19 May 2015, SWD (2015) 111. Also: P. Muller, Conlon G.,   Denvani 
S. and Benard C. (2013), Performance-based Policy, Study for the IMCO Committee. 
9  Communication from the Commission of 6 May 2015, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, COM(2015) 
192. 
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This is also the approach that the Commission follows in its Digital Economic and Society 
Index (DESI)10 which monitors five main areas: (1) connectivity, (2) human capital and skills 
(3) use of Internet, (4) integration of digital technologies, and (5) digital public services. 
However, holistic approach raises the risks of lack of prioritization, waste of political and 
financial capital and, ultimately, failure to meet objectives. Therefore, it is the important to 
(1) first prioritize policy initiatives on the basis of their potential effects which should 
be determined on the basis of a rigorous impact assessment and then (2) closely monitor 
the implementation of those priorities to determine whether they achieve their goals on 
the basis of a rigorous ex post assessment and adapt actions and priorities when needed.11 
  
2.2. Priority actions 
Determining priorities among the possible policy actions regarding the regulation of digital 
networks and services is very difficult as there is no sufficient quantitative data on the impact 
of the main policy actions in the impact assessments of the Commission or in the academic 
literature.12 
Priories should be determined for network deployment, which is covered by the proposed 
EECC, and for application diffusion, which is only partially and marginally covered by the 
proposed EECC as the latter only deals with the communications applications but not the 
other applications. 
2.2.1. Actions regarding digital networks 
Regarding digital networks, the priority for the policy makers should be to stimulate the 
deployment and the use of infrastructures capable of delivering the new digital 
applications and supporting the IP traffic they will generate.13 This priority is different 
than the one of 25 years ago when the first comprehensive telecom regulatory framework 
was adopted at the EU level. At the time, the main priority was to open to competition existing 
fixed (copper) infrastructure to increase market efficiency. Today, the priority is to stimulate 
the penetration and the take-up of new infrastructures ensuring that European citizens and 
firms could use, while being mobile and on the move, the new digital applications and reap 
their full economic and social benefits. This priority action means that the EU decision makers 
should ensure: 
- that incentives of the private operators to invest in new and/or upgraded networks 
are maximised, 
- that in the areas (mainly rural) where there is no business case for investment, the 
public authorities support investment in an efficient manner without crowding out 
private investment, 
- and that citizens and firms should be able to enjoy an always-on access to those 
infrastructures in the most efficient and the least costly manner.  
Those new infrastructures will combine fixed and mobile elements, in particular with 5G 
developments. According to the impact assessment of the Commission, the introduction of 
5G capabilities could generate a benefits of €146.5 billion per year.14 €95.9 billion will arise 
from first order benefits in the four verticals i.e. automotive, healthcare, transport and 
                                           
10   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/desi 
11   As explained in details in P. Muller, Conlon G., Denvani S. and Benard C. (2013), Performance-based  Policy, 
Study for the IMCO Committee. 
12   When proposing the European Electronic Communications Code, the European Commission did a thorough and 
rigourous impact assessment (see SWD(2016) 303) which was supported by an external study (see WIK-
Ecorys and VVA (2016). However, those were mainly assessing impact of different options for each policy 
actions rather the impact of priorities among policy options. 
13  WIK-Consult, Ecorys and VVA Consulting (2016), Support for the preparation of the impact assessment 
accompanying the review of the regulatory framework for e-communications, Study for the European 
Commission. 
14  Commission Impact assessment of the proposed EECC, SWD(2016) 303, p. 105. 
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utilities. Benefits are distributed across the four sectors between strategic (€32 bn) and 
operational (€12 bn) benefits arising to organisations within the verticals. Relatively high 
levels of benefits were also recognised for the consumers of goods and services (€24 bn) 
from the verticals. Another significant benefit (€10.5 bn) is the ability of 5G to address the 
digital divide and overcome difficulties in providing ubiquitous broadband connectivity in 
more rural areas where current fixed networks struggle to provide adequate service. 
2.2.2. Actions regarding digital services 
Regarding digital services, the priority for the policy makers should be to stimulate the 
development and then the diffusion of public and private Internet applications 
across the internal market. This priority implies to facilitate their financing at the 
beginning with more venture capital and then their scale up with a strengthening of the 
internal market for digital services. According to the European Commission, a fully functioning 
digital single market could generate an additional growth of €415 bn. As only some digital 
applications, namely the ones related to communications services, are covered by the 
proposed EECC, this report does not analyse in depth the actions necessary to stimulate 
digital applications.15 
 
2.3. Governance framework 
The achievement of those priority action requires an appropriate governance framework 
involving EU and National institutions. Given the different characteristics of the digital 
networks and services, the optimal governance framework is different for the regulation of 
networks and services. 
2.3.1. Governance regarding the regulation of digital networks 
Digital networks are mainly composed of physical infrastructures, such are cable under or 
over the streets or mobile antennae towers, which are localised. Thus, according the 
subsidiarity principle, regulation of digital networks should mainly take place at the national, 
or even infra-national, level. However, EU intervention is justified when there are spill-over 
effects between Member States,16 which may be the case of spectrum for instance, or to 
ensure that national regulator meet their objectives in the most efficient way. 
On that basis, we suggest the following optimal governance framework for the 
regulation of digital networks which is based on a strengthened open method of 
coordination:17 
- Each Member State adopts national objectives for network connectivity penetration 
and take-up in 2025 on the basis of guidelines agreed at the EU level, 
- Each national regulatory authority then regulates networks according to national 
circumstances in order to achieve the connectivity objectives in the most efficient 
manner, 
- Each year, the progress towards those objectives are reviewed in a multi-lateral 
dialogue among the Member States and with the Commission. During this dialogue 
best-practices will be identified and apply where relevant, 
- The European Commission has direct means for binding intervention when a 
regulatory decision creates significant spill-overs effects on other Member States or 
                                           
15   See A. Venestra et al. (2013), Ubiquitous Development of the Digital Single Market, Study for the IMCO 
Committee. 
16   On those spill-over effects in telecommunications, see A. de Streel and Ph. Defraigne (2011), “Where  Should 
the European Union Intervene to Foster the Internal Market for eComs”, Communications & Strategies 82, 63-
84. 
17   The open method of coordination was developed in 2000 for the Lisbon Strategy and is now widely used  for the 
coordination of national economic and social policies in the context of the European semester and the Europe 
2020 Strategy: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/european-semester_en 
Optimal regulatory model for telecommunications services in the EU 
 
PE 595.368 19  
when the national authority, because of capture or otherwise, does not deliver on the 
national connectivity objectives in an efficient manner. 
- Moreover, the Commission controls, under the State aids rules, the national public 
financing of network deployment, in particular to ensure it does not entail competitive 
distortion. The Commission may also allocate EU funds to co-finance network 
deployment. 
2.3.2. Governance regarding the regulation of digital services 
Digital services, which run over digital networks, can often be easily traded between Member 
States. As the experience of US or China shows, the market size is key in the scaling up of 
digital services firms (which is one of the main weakness of EU digital firms). Therefore, EU 
rules should facilitate the free movement of digital services within the internal market by 
removing trade barriers. 
In particular, the application of the country-of-origin (home country control) as 
enshrined in the Treaty and some directives important for digital services such as the e-
commerce directive18 or the audio-visual media services directive,19 should be extended to 
all digital services. 
For that principle to be acceptable to Member States, it requires a harmonisation of the 
rules protecting the main public interest as well as an effective implementation of 
those rules. In turn, this requires strong and independent enforcement agencies as well as 





                                           
18   Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects  of 
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic 
commerce), OJ [2000] L 178/1. 
19   Directive 2010/13 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination  of certain 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of 
audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), OJ [2010] L 95/1. 
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 REGULATION OF NETWORKS AND SPECTRUM 
KEY FINDINGS 
- Given the trends in the use of digital applications and the duration of 
investment cycle in network deployment, ambitious connectivity targets are 
justified provided they remain technologically neutral. 
- Those ambitious goals could only be met with ambitious reforms of access 
regulation as well as national and EU financing of new or upgraded networks. 
- Spectrum assignment, while remaining a national competence, should be 
better coordinated at the EU level and made more coherent with other 
regulatory interventions. 
 
3.1. Regulation to stimulate network deployment 
3.1.1. Commission proposal  
Regarding network deployment, the Commission sets ambitious connectivity objectives for 
2025: 
- Gigabit connectivity for all main socio-economic drivers such as schools, transport 
hubs and main providers of public services as well as digitally intensive enterprises; 
- All urban areas and all major terrestrial transport paths to have uninterrupted 5G 
coverage; 
- All European households, rural or urban, will have access to Internet connectivity 
offering a downlink of at least 100 Mbps, upgradable to Gigabit speed. 
Regarding network regulation, the Commission does not propose fundamental change to the 
current rules but more an evolution to increase the incentives to invest in network 
deployment, in particular very high capacity (VHC) networks. Access regulation will continue 
to be based on operators having significant market power determined on the basis of 
competition law methodologies. However, the Commission proposes targeted changes to 
ensure adequate returns on new investments relative to risks and give Europe-wide 
predictability to the international investment community, while leaving adequate scope for 
adaptation to localised network conditions. For example, the Commission proposes to 
prioritise network access remedies that directly support competitive infrastructure 
deployment wherever feasible, and reflecting the retail choices already available to end-
users. The Commission also proposes to expand the menu of remedies at the disposal of 
national regulatory authorities to ensure they can chose the remedies that better fit their 
national circumstances.  
3.1.2. Critical assessment and Recommendations 
a. Connectivity objectives 
The Commission sets very ambitious connectivity objectives, in particular for the nascent 5G 
technology. Given the trends in application diffusion, connectivity needs will surely increase 
over time in Europe and given the long investment cycle for network deployment, it is 
appropriate be ambitious.  
However, it is important that those objectives remain technologically neutral and allow 
the best and the most efficient technology mix to fulfil connectivity needs.20  
                                           
20 Also R. Kenny and B. Williamson (2016), Connectivity for the Gigabit Society, Liberty Global Policy Series. 
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Moreover to be effective, those EU objectives need to be translated into national 
connectivity targets and the progress towards those targets should be monitored regularly. 
b. Regulatory actions and public financing to achieve connectivity objectives 
Ambitious connectivity targets should be matched by ambitious regulatory and financing 
measures to achieve those targets. 
Regarding regulation, the relationship between compulsory regulated access, competition - 
which may be on the same network (intra-network competition) or between networks (inter-
networks competition) – and investment is complex and controversial. Some argue that more 
competition increases the risk of losing customers, hence increases the incentives to invest. 
Others argue that more competition decreases the margins which are necessary to invest, 
hence decreases incentives to invest. However, what is clear is that the priorities of today, 
network deployment, are not the same than the priorities of the past, hence regulators should 
pay more attention to network deployment and should be evaluated that basis. 
According to us, the relative modest changes to the access regulation proposed by 
the Commission go in the right direction but may not be enough to deliver the 
connectivity targets set for 2025. Next to the strengthening of symmetric regulation and 
the additional emphasis on co-investment or wholesale only investment models, the 
Commission could have investigated and possibly proposed the option of exclusive licensing 
of fibre infrastructures which would be open to competing operators.21 
Regarding financing, the Commission needs to adapt the 2012 State Aid Broadband 
Guidelines to ensure their coherence with the new connectivity objectives and with the 
proposed adaptations to the access regulation. 
c. Governance framework to achieve those objectives 
The increased flexibility given to the Member States in regulating their digital networks is 
welcome given the localised nature of such networks. However, this flexibility requires a 
strengthening of EU coordination between NRAs to ensure, on the one hand, that NRAs 
choose the most effective remedies to achieve connectivity objectives and, on the other hand, 
that these remedies do not delay the deployment of very high capacity networks.22 Thus, 
the increased flexibility in the substantive law should go hand in hand with an 
increase coordination between the NRAs, in particular with the transformation of BEREC 
into a fully-fledged EU agency as proposed by the Commission.23 
Moreover, a more precise governance framework, based on a strengthened open 
method of coordination, should be set up to ensure that each Member State adopt 
connectivity objectives able to meet the EU objectives and then they deliver on those national 
targets. 
 
                                           
21   Richard Feasey, Competition for monopoly, 8 June 2015, available on:  
http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxmZWFzZXl3YWxlc3xneDoxMzZj
OWQ5Mzg0NTNkZDll asking “Why shouldn’t the framework allow regulators to sanction the creation of de facto 
or de jure monopolies (…) the UK Government ran competitive tenders for licences which provided exclusive 
rights to offer cable TV services in numerous British cities in the 1990s. And of course spectrum licences in 
telecoms grant exclusive rights to individual firms for particular frequencies, allowing them to exclude rivals in 
the process.” 
22   Markos Tselekounis e.a., Flexibility or certainty? A regulatory dilemma, Fourth Annual Conference On 
Competition And Regulation In Network Industries, 25 November 2011. 
23   WIK-Consult, Deloitte and IDATE (2016), Regulatory, in particular access, regimes for network  investment 
models in Europe, Study for the European Commission, Chapter 13. 
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3.2. Better spectrum assignment 
3.2.1. Commission proposal 
Regarding spectrum assignment, the Commission proposes to strengthen the EU coordination 
and ensure more coherence with market regulation. The Commission proposes assignment 
deadlines and licence periods (for a minimum of 25 years) and a peer review among national 
regulators to ensure consistent assignment practices as well as a consistent approach to 
coverage obligations, to small cell deployment and to network sharing, with the goal to 
stimulate 5G deployment and rural connectivity. 
3.2.2. Critical assessment and Recommendations 
The Commission proposals are very welcome because the lack of coordination and 
coherence in spectrum assignment led to substantial delay in 4G deployment in Europe. As 
spectrum allocation and management is mainly a competence of the Member States, the 
Commission could hardly have made more detailed and intrusive proposals. The active role 
of Member States will be instrumental for the deployment of 5G. Setting common EU 5G 
broadband targets for 2025 is already going much further than the US approach24. 
In addition, Member States should facilitate not only the authorization of small cells 
(with a general authorization regime), but also alleviate imposing too stringent 





                                           
24 As formulated by the then FCC chairman Tom Wheeler on 20 June 2016: « We will be repeating the proven formula 
that made the United States the world leader in 4G. It’s a simple formula: Lead the world in spectrum availability, 
encourage and protect innovation-driving competition, and stay out of the way of technological development.“ 
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 INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
- In the Internet age, universal service should focus on affordable broadband 
connections allowing access to the indispensable e-services (such as email, 
telephony and video, social network, online news, ecommerce site and e-gov 
services). In an app economy, universal service should maximise the 
availability and the affordability of Wi-Fi connections. 
- Users of Internet access service need to be protected given the importance of 
a service which is the door to the Information society and the often little 
competition for its provision. This can be achieved with general consumer 
protection rules which are smarter and better enforced complemented with 
the net neutrality EU rules adopted in 2015 with the Open Internet Regulation. 
 
One of the most important changes proposed by the Commission is the new categorization 
of electronic communications services that includes now explicitly the communications Over-
the-Top (OTT) services (ECS) such as Skype, Viber or WhatsApp. As shown in Figure 12 and 
detailed in Annex 2 of this report, the Commission proposes to divide the ECS into four main 
categories:25 
- the Internet Access Service (IAS) which covers the Internet connections offered by 
the Internet service providers via fixed or non-fixed technologies; 
 
- the number-based Interpersonal Communications Service (ICS) which covers the 
traditional telecommunications services; 
 
- the number-independent Interpersonal Communications Service (ICS) which covers 
the new communications OTT services such as Skype, WhatsApp or Viber; 
 
- the service consisting wholly or mainly of the conveyance of signals, such as 












                                           
25   See proposed Article 2 EECC. Under the current regulatory framework, the status of OTT is not totally clear and 
most of them are not covered by the electronic communications rules: see BEREC (2016), Report on OTT 
services, BoR(16) 35. 
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Figure 12: The categories of electronic communications services 
 
 
Those categories are important as they determine the obligations that the future EECC will 
impose on the providers of each respective category of services. The most extensive 
obligations apply to the providers of IAS and the number-based ICS, but some obligations 
also apply to number-independent ICS, often referred to as OTT (see infra, Table 3). This 
section deals with the Internet Access Service, which is the door to the information society 
and necessary to access most of the digital services, including the other ECS. The other ECS 
are dealt in section 5. 
 
4.1. Universal service: the availability and accessibility of Internet access 
services 
4.1.1. Proposal of the Commission 
The Code aims to adapt universal service to the broadband Internet society and proposes the 
following main changes: 
- USO should focus on affordability and not availability of Internet access. The 
availability, which is the most costly obligation as it requires network deployment, 
should be principally achieved by other means than USO such as private investment 
whose incentives should be maximised by regulation, or public investment with EU 
and/or national budget. It is only when those other means do not deliver availability 
that USO can be used;26 
 
- USO is limited to Internet access and not any more to other legacy services of the 
telephony time; 27 
 
- The required Internet access is defined on the basis of a list of minimum services 
indispensable in the Information society such as email, search engines, social 
networks, e-gov services ….28 
Moreover, the Commission proposes to remove the option for Member States to have the net 
cost of USO financed through a levy on operators.29 Taking into account a broader range of 
beneficiaries (beyond the telecom sector) of universal broadband, the proposal relies on 
financing through the general budget as a more equitable and less distortive way of funding 
the provision of universal service.  
                                           
26 Proposed Articles 80-81 EECC. 
27 Proposed Article 79(1) EECC. 
28 Proposed Article 79(2) and Annex V EECC. 
29 Proposed Article 85 EECC. 
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4.1.2. Critical assessment and Recommendations 
The proposal of the Commission goes in the right direction30 in focusing the USO on Internet 
access service but needs some guidelines to frame the freedom left to the Member States in 
implementing USO according to their national circumstances and preferences. It is also not 
ambitious enough and not yet adapted to the app economy where citizens need to be 
connected outside their main residences. We examine those issues in turn. 
a. Functional Internet access at a fixed location 
Given the evolution towards all-IP and the increased competition on the communications 
services running over the top of an Internet connection, it is appropriate to focus USO on 
Internet access and not on the other communications services such as voice or 
directories. Moreover, given the importance of having access to some e-services, it is 
appropriate to define the capability of the Internet connection as supporting those 
e-services. 
However, three issues need to be kept during the political negotiations and be clarified during 
those negotiations or afterwards with Commission guidelines. 
First, the functional Internet access, guaranteed by USO, should be defined in terms 
of data volume necessary to support the basic e-services and not in terms of speed. 
This is important because today Internet Services Providers apply ‘flat rate’ pricing strategies, 
sometimes with unlimited data. Monthly prices depend not only of the maximum possible 
speed, but also of the amount of data included. A reasonable ‘cap’ can be determined on the 
basis of, on the one hand, usage statistics of the different services listed in Annex V EECC, 
where surveys are available, and, on the other, the data volume that this usage represents.31 
According to the study done for the Commission by Tech4i et al. (2016), the bandwidth and 
data requirement for a so-called ‘primary basket’ of e-services32 are the following. 











4 Mbps 9.6 Mbps 10 GB/month 26 GB/month 
Source: Tech4i et al. (2016, p. 56) 
The Commission proposal should either entrust the Commission to fix such cap(s) or require 
NRAs to do so, taking into account national specificities. In the absence of such clarification, 
the affordability requirement remains vague allowing inconsistent interpretations and 
implementation throughout the EU.  
Second, the obligation to finance USO with public funds and not with a sector fund 
should be maintained in the adopted Code.33 Several Member States are calling to keep 
the current financing flexibility and argue that they are best placed to decide which the best 
financing mechanism is. However, sector fund has several disadvantages:34 (i) it may be 
                                           
30    While raising “some concerns about the potential market distortions and increased bureaucracy that might arise 
from expanding the affordability measures to include mobile services as well as to the practicalities of monitoring 
the situation of end users with respect to affordability”, BEREC welcomes the approach. ((See High-level Opinion 
of December 2016 on the European Commission’s proposals for a review of the electronic communications 
framework, BoR (16) 213, p. 3). 
31   https://www.broadbandchoices.co.uk/guides/broadband/guide-to-internet-data-usage 
32   This primary basket of e-services corresponds to the services that the Commission proposes to use to define the 
universal service connectivity. 
33   As currently proposed in Article 85 EECC. 
34   Tech4i2, Time.lex BV CVBA, Acreo and Genesis Media (2016), Review of the scope of Universal Service, Study 
for the European Commission, Chapter 12); and A. de Streel and P. Larouche (2016), An Integrated 
Regulatory Framework for Digital Networks and Services, CERRE Policy Report, p. 32. 
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costly to run; (ii) it is unfair as it forces the telecom sector to finance an infrastructure that 
benefits the whole society; (iii) and it is inefficient. Indeed, the economic literature35 shows 
that, unless the national tax system is very distorted, public funds are more efficient and less 
distortive than sector funds to finance USO for many reasons: it increases the tax base, which 
in turn allows a reduction of the tax rate which then reduces the crowding-out effects of the 
taxes; it forces the State to internalise the effects of its decisions as the costs of any extension 
of the USO decided by the State is supported by the State itself and not the sector.36 
Third, the principle that USO is not an industrial policy tool to support network 
deployment should also be maintained in the adopted Code.37 During the political 
negotiation, some policy makers may see USO as a quick and easy way to finance network 
deployment, especially in the rural areas where the costs are the highest. If the USO can 
only be financed with public funds, as currently proposed, using USO for network deployment 
is not problematic and probably inevitable in some rural areas. However, if the USO could be 
financed by a sector fund, as it can be feared, then the sector may be forced to finance the 
potential huge network deployment costs.38 This may even backfire as the heavy taxes on 
the sector may decease competition, which is one of the main tool to stimulate investment 
and network deployment.39   
b. The list of services which the functional internet access shall be capable of 
The Commission proposal requires the Member States to define the mandated universal 
functional internet access service in their territory. This access shall be capable of supporting 
the following minimum set of services: 
- E-mail,  
- search engines enabling search and finding of all type of information, 
- basic training and education online tools,  
- online newspapers/news, 
- buying/ordering goods or services online, 
- job searching and job searching tools, 
- professional networking, 
- internet banking, 
- e-Government service use,  
- social media and instant messaging, 
- calls and video calls (standard quality). 
A missing element in the list is e-Health.  According to the Tech4i2 study,40 benefits of 
combining broadband connectivity and health have emerged from chronic disease 
management; electronic health records; online health education; telemedicine; electronic 
patient records and secure messaging systems between health providers and the collection 
of information from wireless sensors in patients’ homes will improve the management of 
chronic diseases and could reduce treatment costs by between 10 and 20%. 
                                           
35   European Commission – DG ECFIN (1999), Liberalisation of Network Industries: Economic implications and main 
policy issues, European Economy, 1999/4 and, J. Hausmann (1998), "Taxation by Telecommunications 
Regulation", in J. Poterba (ed), Tax Policy and the Economy 12, 29-48, NBER and MIT Press. 
36   In the specific EU context, there is an additional internal market rationale because the operators active in the 
Member States where they have to pay important USO sector contributions suffer from a competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the operators active in countries where is no such heavy financial burden. 
37   As currently proposed in Article 81 EECC. 
38   Depending of the e-services that the universal service connexions should be able to allow, the costs of  network 
deployment has been estimated by Tech4i2, Time.lex BV CVBA, Acreo and Genesis Media (2016), Review of the 
scope of Universal Service, Study for the European Commission, chapter 8 between €6.8 and 46.9 billion in 2015 
and between €13.7 and 143.8 billion in 2020. 
39   A. de Streel and P. Larouche (2016), An Integrated Regulatory Framework for Digital Networks and Services, 
CERRE Policy Report, p. 30. 
40   O.c. p. 52 
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c. The right to ubiquitous internet access 
The Commission proposal aims to ensure an affordable access at only one single fixed location 
and focuses more on the speed of connections than on access everywhere. However, in the 
app economy, it is the connectivity reach and the possible to have an affordable access 
everywhere which is key.41 
Such affordable always-on connectivity could not be achieved with the mobile connections 
only. At the national level, massive use of mobile connectivity could lead to congestion 
problems.42 At the European level, the price of international data roaming make such 
connection expensive, even taking into account the price control that have been set.43 It is 
therefore a mix of mobile and Wi-Fi connections that will ensure in an efficient manner an 
always-on connection within the Member States and across the internal market. In fact, the 
substantial majority of all traffic to smartphones and tablets (which we see as mobile devices) 
is already carried over Wi-Fi at home and at work (and thus over the fixed network). Today 
most of the Wi-Fi internet access still happens at the home. But this is not due to a consumer 
preference to access the internet at home, but rather on the limited availability of hot and 
home spots.44 It is expected that globally, total public Wi-Fi hotspots (including homespots) 
will grow six-fold from 2016 to 2021, from 94.0 million in 2016 to 541.6 million by 2021. 
Total Wi-Fi homespots will grow from 85.1 million in 2016 to 526.2 million by 2021.45 
Commercial hotspots are a smaller subset of the overall public Wi-Fi hotspot forecast and will 
grow from 8.8 Million in 2016 to 15.3 Million by 2021. 
It is therefore regrettable that the preparatory external studies as well as the Commission 
Impact assessment do not examine the option of imposing Wi-Fi access everywhere. The 
Commission only proposes, within the Connection Europe Facility, a simple financing 
mechanism of €120 million for the installation of local wireless access points where no freely 
accessible public or private access points delivering very high-speed broadband exist (the 
WiFI4EU proposal).46 
To be more future-proof, the Code should maximise the availability of Wi-Fi 
connections in the public spaces managed by the State or even managed by private parties 
as well as via homespots networks. 
- Wi-Fi in public spaces managed by the State: The co-legislators should 
investigate the possibility of requiring that all government entities managing public 
areas (such as railroad stations, public buildings, schools or public hospitals) provide 
                                           
41   Not being able to get online in the first place makes speed a moot point: “Do people really care if a big file takes 
20 minutes rather than 25 to arrive, when they can’t get online at all?”– As a matter of fact, most consumers 
connect to the internet via the domestic combined domestic Wi-Fi router and modem provided by their ISP. The 
router, once connected and switched on, is usually totally unmanaged by the ISP. If the router is only offering 
1Mbps thanks to local Wi-Fi congestion or bad end user equipment reception, then no matter how much better 
the connection the ISP provides, the customer will only ever experience a 1Mbps connection. Most of the 
consumers do not complain as long the connectivity is not patchy. 
42   As noted by the Study underlying the 2014 Recommendation on Relevant Markets, p. 57: “if LTE is massively 
used for IPTV services, customers will experience congestion problems during peak times such as an important 
football match between Germany and Italy. [However] in rural areas there are less mobile network users and 
people may rely more on terrestrial or satellite broadcasting. This makes the congestion problem less 
pronounced. In rural areas, LTE may be more of a substitute for fixed broadband than in urban areas.” 
43   However, it is doubtful that the amounts agreed for the wholesale data roaming rates gliding path will achieve 
the demand side objective.  For example, by 2022 average mobile consumption will reach more than 12 GB per 
month, which would cost €30, much less than today but still prohibitive for many users. 
44   In the Czech Republic, where hotspots were pervasively deployed, the regulator highlighted that Wi-Fi access 
was from the point of end users the second most widespread platform to gain internet access after xDSL and 
that Wi-Fi access represented a substitute particularly for the most price-sensitive customers, see Commission 
Decision of 10 August 2012 in Case CZ/2012/1322: Wholesale Broadband Access in the Czech Republic C(2012) 
5654). 
45  CISCO p. 20 
46  Commission Proposal of 14 September 2016 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Regulations 1316/2013 and 283/2014 as regards the promotion of Internet connectivity in local 
communities, COM(2016) 589. 
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free Wi-Fi access. In most cases, these public bodies already have broadband 
subscriptions and the Wi-Fi obligation would only lead to an increase in communication 
costs, which is likely to be limited taking into account the decreasing cost of bandwidth 
resulting from the deployment of high speed fibre (based) networks. 
 
• Wi-Fi in public spaces managed by private persons: The co-legislators should 
also investigate the possibility to impose Wi-Fi availabilities to private parties making 
public areas accessible such as shops, hotels and restaurants. Imposing obligations 
on private persons may imply legal challenges in some Member States. However, this 
has already been done in other public policy areas, for example for the prohibition of 
smoking in public places.47 In addition, the costs of this Wi-Fi obligation can be 
maintained significantly below the public benefits of increasing internet access. As it 
is the case for publicly institutions, the concerned private entities and physical persons 
already have broadband connections, so that the measure would only lead to a 
marginal increase in usage cost and private persons would commercially benefit from 
the obligation. Member States could also subsidize part of the cost of installation in 
addition to the Connection Europe Facility budget earmarked for WIFI4EU. Moreover, 
as advocated in reply48 to the public consultation on the evaluation and the review of 
the regulatory framework for electronic communications, an EU wide safe harbour49 
could be introduced for the providers of these Wi-Fi hotspots.   
 
- Wi-Fi via homespot networks: Today, the main EU ISPs are increasingly providing 
out-of-home Wi-Fi coverage to their customers via the sharing of their customers’ 
homespots with their other subscribers.50 Public home spots make use of the routers 
(hubs) installed in their private customers’ living rooms, halls and studies. Given that 
the public home spot takes minimal bandwidth (and always gives way to the private 
usage) and that the hubs are widely spread even in relatively low population density 
areas, it is an efficient, low-cost, low-energy way to provide on-line access to huge 
areas and huge numbers of people.51 
Over a number of years, these measures would lead to a Wi-Fi internet access nearly 
anywhere anytime in the EU in favour of broadband subscribers, and in particular for those 
with universal service internet access contracts. These obligations should be reviewed 
once 5G networks become ubiquitous because then the connectivity offered by 5G 
network could meet the requirement for an affordable and always-on connectivity.52 
Moreover, as 5G is being introduced, plans will be generous with data caps and speeds will 
                                           
47   Council recommendation of 30 November 2009 on smoke-free environment, O.J. C 296/4 of 5.12.2009  
48   According to the synthesis report on the public consultation on the evaluation and review of the regulatory 
framework for electronic communications, 20 April 2016, integrated into the Impact Assessment, SWD(2016) 
303 final, Part 2/3, p.15. 
49   In the wake of the Judgment of the Court of 15 September 2016 (Case C-484/14, Tobias Mc Fadden v Sony 
Music Entertainment Germany GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2016:689) an amendment to Article 12 of the Directive 
2000/31 (‘Directive on electronic commerce’) may be appropriate. The amendment would clarify that the 
providers of these universal service Wi-Fi hotspots would bear no liability as long as they make access subject 
to a password that can obtained by the visitor of their premises or a preliminary registration (or equivalent 
identification – e.g. in the case of smartphones via the SIM card).  
50  Operators are picking up on this demand by continuously expanding their number of public Wi-Fi hot- and 
homespots.  Orange France, BT and SFR are leading. The French operator Free follows with 3 million Wi-Fi 
homespots. The operator with the highest density of Wi-Fi spots is the Liberty Global held cableco Ziggo of the 
Netherlands with 2 million Wi-Fi hot- and homespots: Tefficient, Using public Wi-Fi as customer magnet, Sep 24, 
2016, available on: http://media.tefficient.com/2016/09/tefficient-industry-analysis-4-2016-Using-public-Wi-Fi-
as-customer-magnet.pdf. 
51  In parallel, the import and putting on the market in the EU of routers not capable of being set up as public home 
hubs should be forbidden, in the absence of voluntary commitments from the manufacturers. 
52  As noted by CCG Consulting, Looking Closer at 5G , https://potsandpansbyccg.com/2016/10/03/looking-closer-
at-5g/: “(I)n places with a lot of people, like stadiums, shopping centres or large business buildings, that there 
will be a migration from Wi-Fi to millimetre wave spectrum using the 5G standard. This very well could ultimately 
result in gigabit speeds on devices with the right antennas to receive that signal.” 
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be high enough to encourage traffic to stay on the mobile network instead of being offloaded, 
so the customer offload percentage may be less than 50 percent.53 
 
4.2. Additional consumer protection for Internet access services 
Given the importance of the Internet access service as the door to the Information society, 
the proposed Code imposes several obligations to the Internet Service Providers to protect 
the end-users. End-users are defined as all natural persons or legal entities not providing 
electronic communications networks and services, hence include consumers and non-telecom 
or Internet companies.54  
4.2.1. Proposal of the Commission 
The proposed Code carries forward most of the end-users rights imposed by the current 
regulatory framework and imposes on the Internet Access Providers obligations on the 
following issues: 
- Transparency: information requirements for contracts and comparison of offers,55 
- Quality of service, 56 
- Contract duration, termination and facility for switching,57 
- Equivalent access for disabled users,58 
Those obligations apply in addition to those foreseen by the Open Internet Regulation, which 
relates to net neutrality and transparency59 as well as those foreseen by the general EU 
consumer acquis. 
4.2.2. Critical assessment and Recommendations 
Given the importance of IAS in the Information Society and the often little competition for its 
provision (there is often the choice between only two possible providers), a strong 
protection for the consumers, and possibly also for the other end-users, is justified. 
However, given the obligations in the general consumer protection acquis (which 
protects consumers) and those in the Open Internet regulation (which protects all 
end-users), the additional obligations of the Code are not justified for the following 
reasons: (i) first, the net neutrality obligation can already protect in many ways the end-
users; (ii) second, as explained in the following section, it would be more effective and 
coherent to improve the rules and the enforcement of the general consumer protection acquis 
instead of creating a complex sector-specific end-users protection. 
In particular, the information requirement for contracts is already dealt by the Open Internet 
Regulation laying down measures concerning open internet access which requires strict 
transparency measures on IAS providers, including that any contract which includes internet 
access services specifies at least a number of information, such as a clear and comprehensible 
explanation of the minimum, normally available, maximum and advertised download and 
upload speed of the internet access services in the case of fixed networks, or of the estimated 
maximum and advertised download and upload speed of the internet access services in the 
case of mobile networks. 
                                           
53  CISCO Visual Networking Index (2017), Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast: Update 2016-2021, White 
Paper, p.17. 
54   Proposed Article 2(14) EECC. 
55   Proposed Articles 95 and 96 EECC. 
56   Proposed Article 97 EECC. 
57   Proposed Articles 98-99 EECC. 
58  Proposed Article 103 EECC. 
59   Articles 3 and 4 Regulation 2015/2120 and BEREC Guidelines of August 2016 on the Implementation by National 
Regulators of European Net Neutrality Rules, BoR(2016) 127.  
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In addition, specific safeguards are necessary to facilitate switching between IAS providers 
(who may be using different physical networks)60, including allowing consumers to cancel 
their contract without incurring any costs upon notice of changes in the contractual conditions 
proposed by the IAS provider61 and a limitation of the maximum initial contractual 
commitment period duration. 
At the same time, the proposal of the Commission to allow Member States to prohibit 
minimum commitment periods for IAS shorter than the 24 months62 does not seem 
appropriate. The provision of fixed internet access can require substantial installation cost 
per subscriber. The shorter the period is over which the initial installation cost can be 
depreciated, the higher the monthly subscription cost will be. Shorter minimum commitment 
periods can mean higher tariffs. Longer commitment periods could also be an incentive for 
operators to deploy NGA networks in less dense areas, by offering guaranteed returns.63 The 
regulation should balance the interest of certain users (usually not the most vulnerable) in 
changing providers with the interest of lowering the overall cost of internet access. Moreover, 
the maximum minimum initial commitment period for fixed and wireless IAS should not be 
the same. 
                                           
60   Proposed Article 99(1) EECC. 
61   Point (k) of the annex to UCTD prohibits terms “enabling the seller or supplier to alter unilaterally without a valid 
reason any characteristics of the product or service to be provided”, but this prohibition is not operational enough 
to protect consumers effectively. 
62   Proposed Article 98 EECC. 
63   The exception provided in Article 98 (“This paragraph shall not apply to the duration of an instalment contract 
where the consumer has agreed in a separate contract to instalment payments for deployment of a physical 
connection”) is too narrow to incentivize NGA deployment, beyond specific deployment models as the Swedish. 
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  INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES  
 
KEY FINDINGS 
- Traditional telecommunications services are not (any more) so special and do 
not require any more extensive sector-specific consumer protection rules. The 
use of communications OTTs is rapidly growing in the EU indicating consumers’ 
satisfaction. They should not be subject to legacy rules that were justified at 
the time of traditional telephony but not today. Moreover, the use of telephone 
numbers justify additional obligations. 
- Telecommunications services are global by nature and are instrumental in 
building the digital single market. Hence, regulatory fragmentation and the 
application of 28 regulatory frameworks should be avoided. 
- In the context of the current review of the EU consumer acquis, rules should 
be made smarter by better taking into account the numerous consumers’ 
biases and by better integrating consumer protection directly into the 
computer code (‘consumer protection by design’). 
- Moreover, those general rules should be better enforced at the national level 
by strengthening the resources and the power of sanction of the consumer 
protection agencies. 
 
Next to the Internet Access Services, the proposed Code imposes obligations on the three 
other types of Electronic Communications Services, and in particular on the number-based 
Interpersonal Communications Services. Some of those obligations are linked to the granting 
of numbers which is a scarce resources while other aimed to protect the end-users. This 
section focuses on the latter. 
 
5.1. The proposals of the Commission 
One of the most important changes in the proposed Code is the extension of its scope to 
communications OTTs under the new category of number-independent ICS. Given the 
importance of those OTTs and their increased substitutability with traditional 
telecommunications services (the number-based ICS),64 the Commission felt that it was 
necessary to allow the NRAs to impose on them obligations related to security, emergency 
calls and interoperability. 
As shown in Table 3, the proposed Code creates different level of regulatory burden for each 
type of ECS: 
- For the number-based ICS, the proposed Code carries forward most of the obligations 
which are currently applicable to the traditional telecommunications services. A little 
streamlining has been done to take into account the adoption of horizontal legislations 
since the last revision of the telecom regulatory framework, in particular the adoption 
of the Consumer Rights Directive in 2011 and the Network and Security Directive in 
2016. In addition, several obligations are specifically linked to the grating of numbers. 
 
                                           
64   As shown in WIK-Consult and TNO (2015), Over-the-Top (OTT) players: Market dynamics and policy challenges, 
Study for the European Parliament; and Ecorys and TNO (2016), Future trends and business models in 
communication services, Study for the European Commission. 
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- For the signals conveyance services, the proposed Code carries forward most of the 
obligations which are currently applicable to the traditional telecommunications 
services.  
 
- For the number-independent ICS, the proposed Code imposes only one obligation 
relating to security, which is very close to the obligations already imposed by the NIS 
directive, and opens the door to two new obligations related to emergency calls and 
services interoperability. 
Table 3: Types of electronic communications services and associated end-user rights65 
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5.2. Critical assessment and Recommendations 
5.2.1. Extension of the regulation to communications OTTs 
The extension of the scope of the electronic communications regulatory framework to 
communications OTTs is proposed because those OTTs are increasingly used by EU 
consumers and competing with traditional telecommunications services already covered by 
regulation. As this stage, this extension does not increase much the regulatory burden as 
OTT services will not be treated in the same way than traditional telecommunications services 
and will be subject only to the security obligations. However, that may change in the future 
because the proposed Code opens the door to additional obligations related to emergency 
calls and services interoperability. 
                                           
65   This Table is partly based on the WIK-Consult, Cullen International and CRIDS (2016), Substantive issues for 
review in the areas of market entry, management of scarce resources and general end-user issues, Study for 
the European Commission, pp. 275-284. 
66  Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83. 
67  Services Directive 2006/123. 
68  Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29. 
69  Unfair Contract Terms Directive 93/13. 
70  Alternative Dispute Resolution Directive 2013/11. 
71  Network and Information Security Directive 2016/1148. 
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We think that this extension of scope is problematic and unjustified. It is problematic because 
communications OTTs are by nature global,72 hence they are better regulated at the EU level 
or should benefit from the country-of-origin principle (home-country control). However, the 
electronic communications regulation framework is based on the principle of country-of-
destination.73 Hence, the risk is now that communications OTTs will be subject to 28 different 
national regulatory frameworks instead of one as it is currently the case.74  
Instead of moving the communications OTTs towards the EECC (and its principle of 
country of destination), it would be better to move the traditional 
telecommunications services towards the e-commerce Directive (and its principle 
of country of origin).75 That would ensure a coherence between the characteristics of the 
law and of the services and stimulate the digital single market. 
Figure 14: Coherence between characteristics of the law and the services 
 
IAS                       ICS with numbers                      ICS without numbers 






EECC                                                            ecommerce Directive 
Country-of destination principle                        country-of-origin principle 
 
The extension of the ecoms regulation to OTTs also unjustified as its objectives can be 
achieved with the improvements of general consumer protection rules combined with 
innovative co-regulatory approaches. 
                                           
72  See WIK-Consult and TNO (2015), Over-the-Top (OTT) players: Market dynamics and policy challenges, Study 
for the European Parliament, noting at p. 112: “(…) where European companies seek to gain similar scale to 
those in the US or other large geographic regions, it makes sense to harmonise rules applying to online services 
and, to the extent possible, to enforce them across a wide geographic area. Therefore, wherever practicable, 
rules applying to online service providers should (preferably) be fully harmonised at EU level. A European 
authority or co-ordination body might in some cases be justified. Wherever full harmonisation would not be 
possible, efforts should be made to pursue the country of origin principle”. 
73  This is justified for digital network infrastructures that are mainly local but not for digital services. 
74  For example, which the ‘competent authority' to which security breaches would have to be reported under the 
proposed Electronic Communications Code? Under Article 12(2) of the Commission proposal, number-
independent OTTs would not need to operate under the general authorization regime for electronic 
communications services and would not be required to make a declaration to national regulatory authorities of 
all Member States in which they are active. This means that if the Commission proposal is adopted, OTTs would 
have to notify security breaches to the authorities of all Member States in which their service is potentially 
available, including possibly translating their notification into all national languages. The extension of the 
Framework’s obligations to global OTTs will necessarily lead to problem of international jurisdiction. For 
example, millions of Chinese tourists and businesspeople in the EU communicate through the cross-platform 
instant messaging service developed by Tencent, WeChat. In case a security breach occurs somewhere in 
China, should WeChat report to all EU Member States? Moreover, instant message platforms are in constant 
evolution and now allow ‘apps within the app’. For example, WeChat contains apps allowing paying bills, order 
goods and services, send money to other users, and pay in stores. If an app is implemented within WeChat 
allowing users – including when staying in the EU - to call subscribers of the Chinese fixed (or mobile) telephone 
networks, would we WeChat then suddenly become a number based personal communications service subject 
to all national rules adopted in the EU under the Commission proposal? 
75  A. de Streel and P. Larouche (2016), An Integrated Regulatory Framework for Digital Networks and 
Services, CERRE Policy Report, p. 35. To ensure that the removal of the traditional telecommunications 
services from the sector-specific regulation does not undermine consumer protection this reform should be 
coupled with an improvement of the rules and enforcement of the horizontal consumer acquis as we show in 
the following section. 
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5.2.2. A smarter way to distribute obligations 
a. Horizontal consumer protection rules 
Many of the obligations contained in the proposed EECC are already covered by the EU 
horizontal consumer protection, albeit in a less detailed manner and only for consumers and 
not the other end-users (mainly firms which are not electronic communications providers). 76 
Instead of relying on sector-specific detailed rules which run the risks of incoherence 
with horizontal rules, of creating confusion among consumers and firms and of being quickly 
outdated by technology and market evolutions, it would be more effective and coherent 
to rely on improved general consumer protection rules. The forthcoming review of the 
EU consumer acquis gives the opportunity to follow such approach. 
The first improvement is at the substantive level and aims at making the horizontal 
rules smarter. One avenue for progress is better take into account the insights of the 
behavioural studies highlighting the numerous biases in consumers’ behaviours.77 
An obvious example is the information overload, sometimes strategically manufactured by 
the operators, sometimes imposed by the law. Many recent studies show that consumers will 
not, and often cannot, read long and complicated terms of use.78 It is more important that 
they receive only the key information on which they will base their choices in an 
understandable format and at the moment when they make the choices. Therefore, the 
proposal of the EECC to impose summary contracts whose format will be designed by the 
regulators,79 may be a step in the right direction. However, they should not be limited to the 
telecom sector but foreseen in the horizontal rules. 
Moreover, with the rapid development of artificial intelligence personal assistant, 
consumption choices will be not be made by the consumer herself but by her algorithm. In 
this case, the problem will no longer be the information overload but machine readability of 
the information and neutrality of the algorithm. 
Another avenue for progress consists in integrating consumer protection directly into 
the technological design and use the computer code, in complement with the legislative 
code, to protect consumers.80 This approach is now applied for privacy with the “privacy by 
design” obligation enshrined in the GDPR.81 
A second improvement to the horizontal consumer protection rules is at the 
enforcement level. In several Member States, many consumer protection rules are poorly 
enforced and cause customer complaints and un-satisfaction. To remedy those situations, 
policy makers are often changing rules. They make them more detailed, more complex and 
more sector specific, possibly leading to even poorer enforcement. 
To alleviate this vicious circle, it is better to keep the rules general, so they can adapt to 
rapid technology and market evolutions, but dedicate sufficient resources to effective 
                                           
76  See also WIK-Consult, Cullen International and CRIDS (2016), Substantive issues for review in the areas of 
market entry, management of scarce resources and general end-user issues, Study for the European 
Commission, pp. 275-284.  
77  Those biases have been summarised in 2011 by the Economics Nobel-prize winner D. Kahneman in his seminal 
textbook Thinking Fast and Slow, Penguin. 
78  Ecorys et al. (2016), Consumers’ attitudes towards Terms and Conditions, Study for the European Commission; 
Norwegian Consumer Protection Agency (2016), APPFAIL: Threats to Consumers in Mobile Apps; Bakos Y., 
Marotta-Wurgler F. and D.R. Trossen (2014), “Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to 
Standard-Form Contracts”, Journal of Legal Studies, 43(1), 1-35. 
79  Proposed Article 95(5) EECC. 
80  One of the first author to have developed the idea of using the IT code as a regulatory tool is Lawrence Lessig 
in his seminal book, Code and Other Laws of the Cyberspace – Version 2.0, Basic Book. 
81  The concept was originated by a Resolution on Privacy by Design adopted at the 32nd International Conference 
of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners in October 2010. 
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enforcement while giving enforcers enough sanctioning powers.82 Those strengthened 
consumer protection agencies could adopt, on the basis of general rules, more specific 
guidelines to increase the certainty and the deterrence of the law.83 In addition, those 
agencies could set-up, with the industry and consumer associations, multi-stakeholders 
forums to develop code of good practices and other co-regulatory instruments.84 
b. Horizontal Security rules 
As for consumer protection, most of the security obligations proposed in the EECC are already 
covered by the recently adopted NIS Directive, albeit in a more general manner. Again, it 
may be more effective to strengthen the enforcement mechanism of the NIS 
Directive instead of adopting more detailed sector-specific security obligations. 
c. Specific rules linked to phone numbers 
Most of the obligations proposed for number-based ICS relate to the use telephone numbers 
(in the format specified in ITU-T Recommendation E.164). Telephone numbers today, and 
likely in the foreseeable future, have a very important status as a function for universal 
accessibility. Its network effects are not matched by any other addressing function for 
individuals. This justifies that services that use phone numbers are subject to specific 
regulation such as for number portability, interconnection and access to 112.  
However, imposing such rules does not require a distinct legal category. Regulatory 
obligations can be imposed as a counterpart for making use of numbering 
resources, as conditions for the allocation (authorisation) of E.164 telephony numbers. In 
other words, the rules on, inter alia, number portability, telephony interconnection and 112 
would only follow from the terms of the individual number allocation decision.85 This could 
be combined with a review of who could be assigned telephone numbers or what criteria need 
to be fulfilled in order for someone to be assigned such numbers. These criteria may need to 
be different depending on how the numbers will be used. 
d. Emergency calls  
The Commission proposal carries over the obligations relating to the single European 
emergency telephone number 112.86  
First, a major 112 emergency call application – the automated eCall system – remains the 
subject of instruments, which are not consolidated into the proposed EECC. The accessibility 
of the EU legislation would be improved if the latter instruments could be consolidated in the 
Code. 
Second, the Commission proposal overlooks that smartphone penetration has overtaken that 
of other mobile phones. A dial pad will no longer be required to initiate emergency calls. ECall 
will enable setting up emergency calls by pushing a red button. 
Further lives could be saved if, instead of having to seek for the dialpad on the smartphone 
screen and then dial three digits, the EECC would require that all smartphones in the 
EU would include an emergency app87, to be further developed by the sector88 in 
                                           
82   A. de Streel and P. Larouche (2016), An Integrated Regulatory Framework for Digital Networks and 
Services, A CERRE Policy Report, p. 42. 
83  As applied for instance for competition law. 
84  See for instance, WIK-Consult (2015), Review of the Open Internet Codes, Report for the Broadband Stakeholder 
Group. 
85  Also in that direction: Swedish Department of Enterprise and Innovation, Non-paper of 7 December 2015 on the 
review of the regulatory framework for electronic communications. 
86  Proposed Article 102 EECC. 
87  In Australia, emergency services, the Government and industry partners developed the app ‘Emergency +’, 
available on  https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.threesixtyentertainment.nesn&hl=en 
88  In the USA, MIT researchers developed such an app. See. The app that could save your LIFE: Emergency service 
tells rescuers HOW to find and save you at the touch of a button, MailOnline, 2 April 2015, available 
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agreement with the European Commission. Such app would, as the eCall system, activate 
Advanced Mobile Location (AML) positioning and should, in addition, enable callers to include 
pictures or videos, which would be forwarded to the ‘Public Safety Answering Points’ as 
defined under the eCall Regulation.89 The app should also ensure that when the user has no 
signal on its network, calls are routed through available Wi-Fi networks. Once connected, the 
caller would not have to speak, given that the information would be sent automatically. 
Moreover, the Commission proposal carries over90 the obligation for the Member States to 
take all necessary measures to ensure the fullest possible availability of publicly available 
telephone services provided over public communications networks in the event of 
catastrophic network breakdown or in cases of force majeure. However, this provision should 
include access to available Wi-Fi hot or homespots. After the terrorist attack in the Brussels 
in March 2016, the main Belgian mobile networks ceased functioning in Brussels.91  
e. The issue of interoperability 
The existing provisions regarding interoperability were designed for vertically integrated 
providers of telecom infrastructure. They were providing (managed) services over their 
networks and controlled subscribers, who could only be reached through that operator. Call 
termination on the fixed and mobile telephone networks are bottlenecks and that is the 
reason why regulation of the telephone service was (and likely still is) required. 
On the other hand, over-the-top (OTT) services are online services which do not have 
necessarily control over their subscribers. Online services allow ‘multi-homing’.92 End-user 
can download different apps on her smartphone and call or be called on any of them. 
Moreover, the success of OTT services came because they empowered consumers: they 
provided not only lower prices and more functionalities, but also allow instantaneous 
switching. The consumer does even not need deleting the app from her smartphone. She 
merely can use other, competing apps. In such context, interoperability obligations on apps 
is much less justified.  
                                           
on:http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3023155/The-app-save-LIFE-Emergency-service-tells-
rescuers-save-touch-button.html#ixzz4TIpI3WbD  
89  Regulation 2015/758 of 29 April 2015 concerning type-approval requirements for the deployment of the eCall 
in-vehicle system based on the 112 service and amending Directive 2007/46/EC 
90  Proposed Article 101 EECC. 
91  The only alternative were the homespot networks from the fixed operators. The cable operator Telenet took 
immediately the initiative to open its public home spots for anyone. They were soon followed by the 
telecommunications operator Proximus and the cable operator VOO.  
92  This have even been recognised by the General Court of the EU when it upheld the Commission approval of the 
acquisition of Skype by Microsoft: Case T-79/12, Cisco and Messagnet v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2013:635, 
para 79 et sq. 
Optimal regulatory model for telecommunications services in the EU 
 
PE 595.368 37  
REFERENCES 
 
• Bakos Y., Marotta-Wurgler F. and D.R. Trossen (2014), “Does Anyone Read the Fine 
Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts”, Journal of Legal Studies, 43(1), 
1-35. 
• BEREC (2016a), Report on OTT services, BoR(16) 35. 
• BEREC (2016b), Guidelines on the Implementation by National Regulators of European 
Net Neutrality Rules, BoR(2016) 127. 
• BEREC (2016c) High-level Opinion of December 2016 on the European Commission’s 
proposals for a review of the electronic communications framework, BoR (16) 213 
• CISCO Visual Networking Index (2016), The Zettabyte Era: Trends and Analysis, 
White Paper. 
• CISCO Visual Networking Index (2017), Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast: Update 
2016-2021, White Paper. 
• de Streel A. and Ph. Defraigne (2011), “Where Should the European Union Intervene to 
Foster the Internal Market for eComs”, Communications & Strategies 82, 63-84. 
• de Streel A. and Larouche P. (2016), An Integrated Regulatory Framework for Digital 
Networks and Services, CERRE Policy Report. 
• European Commission – DF ECFIN (1999), Liberalisation of Network Industries: 
Economic implications and main policy issues, European Economy, 1999/4. 
• Ecorys and TNO (2016), Future trends and business models in communication services, 
Study for the European Commission. 
• Ecorys et al. (2016), Consumers’ attitudes towards Terms and Conditions, Study for the 
European Commission. 
• Garzaniti L. and O’Regan (2010), Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the Internet: 
EU Competition Law and Regulation, 3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell. 
• Godel M., Harms A., Jones S., Mantovani I. (2016), Reducing Costs and Barriers for the 
Businesses in the Single Market, Study for the IMCO Committee. 
• Hausmann J. (1998), "Taxation by Telecommunications Regulation", in J. Poterba (ed), 
Tax Policy and the Economy 12, 29-48, NBER and MIT Press. 
• Kahneman D. (2011), Thinking Fast and Slow, Pinguin. 
• Kenny R. and T. Broughton (2013), Domestic demand for bandwidth: An approach to 
forecasting requirements for the period 2013-2023, Study for the Broadband 
Stakeholders Group 
• Kenny R. and Williamson B. (2016), Connectivity for the Gigabit Society, Liberty Global 
Policy Series. 
• Lessig L. (2006), Code and Other Laws of the Cyberspace – Version 2.0, Basic Book. 
• Maciejewski M., Fisher N.I., Roginska Y. (2015), Streaming and Online Access to Content 
and Services, Study for the IMCI Committee. 
• Muller P., Conlon G., Denvani S. and Benard C. (2013), Performance-based Policy, Study 
for the IMCO Committee. 
• Norwegian Consumer Protection Agency (2016), APPFAIL: Threats to Consumers in 
Mobile Apps. 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
 
 38 PE 595.368 
• Schiebe F. (2015), Building Blocks of the Ubiquitous Digital Single Market, Study for the 
IMCO Committee. 
• Swedish Department of Enterprise and Innovation (2015), Non-paper on the review of 
the regulatory framework for electronic communications, 7 December. 
• Tech4i2, Time.lex BV CVBA, Acreo and Genesis Media (2016), Review of the scope of 
Universal Service, Study for the European Commission. 
• Venestra A. et al. (2013), Ubiquitous Development of the Digital Single Market, Study 
for the IMCO Committee. 
• WIK-Consult, TNO and RAND (2013), How to Build a Ubiquitous EU Digital Society, Study 
for the European Parliament. 
• WIK-Consult/AEGIS (2013), Impact of traffic off-loading and related technological trends 
on the demand for wireless broadband spectrum, Study prepared for the European 
Commission. 
• WIK-Consult (2015), Review of the Open Internet Codes, Report for the Broadband 
Stakeholder Group. 
• WIK-Consult and TNO (2015), Over-the-Top (OTT) players: Market dynamics and policy 
challenges, Study for the European Parliament. 
• WIK-Consult, Ecorys and VVA Consulting (2016), Support for the preparation of the 
impact assessment accompanying the review of the regulatory framework for e-
communications, Study for the European Commission. 
• WIK-Consult, Deloitte and IDATE (2016), Regulatory, in particular access, regimes for 
network investment models in Europe, Study for the European Commission. 
• WIK-Consult, Cullen International and CRIDS (2016), Substantive issues for review in 
the areas of market entry, management of scarce resources and general end-user issues, 
Study for the European Commission. 
Optimal regulatory model for telecommunications services in the EU 
 
PE 595.368 39  
ANNEX 1: CISCO GLOBAL IP TRAFFIC FORECAST 
This Table shows a summary of the Cisco global IP traffic forecast. 
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ANNEX 2: LEGAL CATEGORIES AND DEFINITIONS 
Electronic communications network: transmission systems, whether or not based on a 
permanent infrastructure or centralised administration capacity, and, where applicable, 
switching or routing equipment and other resources, including network elements which are 
not active, which permit the conveyance of signals by wire, radio, optical or other 
electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit- and packet-switched, 
including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, electricity cable systems, to the extent 
that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for radio and 
television broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type of information 
conveyed (proposed Art. 2(1) EECC). 
Very high capacity network: an electronic communications network which either consists 
wholly of optical fibre elements at least up to the distribution point at the serving location or 
which is capable of delivering under usual peak-time conditions similar network performance 
in terms of available down- and uplink bandwidth, resilience, error-related parameters, and 
latency and its variation. Network performance can be considered similar regardless of 
whether the end-user experience varies due to the inherently different characteristics of the 
medium by which the network ultimately connects with the network termination point 
(proposed Art. 2(2) EECC). 
Electronic communications service: a service normally provided for remuneration via 
electronic communications networks, which encompasses: 
- 'internet access service' as defined in Article 2(2) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120; 
- and/or 'interpersonal communications service'; 
- and/or services consisting wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals such as 
transmission services used for the provision of machine-to-machine services and for 
broadcasting, but excludes services providing, or exercising editorial control over, 
content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services 
(proposed Art. 2(4) EECC). 
Internet access service: a publicly available electronic communications service that 
provides access to the internet, and thereby connectivity to virtually all end points of the 
internet, irrespective of the network technology and terminal equipment used (Article 2(2) 
Regulation 2015/2120). 
Interpersonal communications service: a service normally provided for remuneration 
that enables direct interpersonal and interactive exchange of information via electronic 
communications networks between a finite number of persons, whereby the persons initiating 
or participating in the communication determine its recipient(s); it does not include services 
which enable interpersonal and interactive communication merely as a minor ancillary feature 
that is intrinsically linked to another service (proposed Art. 2(5) EECC). 
Number-based interpersonal communications service: an interpersonal 
communications service which connects with the public switched telephone network, either 
by means of assigned numbering resources, i.e. a number or numbers in national or 
international telephone numbering plans, or by enabling communication with a number or 
numbers in national or international telephone numbering plans (proposed Art. 2(6) EECC). 
Number-independent interpersonal communications service: an interpersonal 
communications service which does not connect with the public switched telephone network, 
either by means of assigned numbering resources, i.e. a number or numbers in national or 
international telephone numbering plans, or by enabling communication with a number or 
numbers in national or international telephone numbering plans (proposed Art. 2(7) EECC) 

